Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 160379, 596 SCRA 57 (Case Digest)

10.  Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160379, 596 SCRA 57

Facts:

            Rosario R. Reyes’ properties (lands) located in Cagayan de Oro city; were expropriated by the DPWH.  One of the lots that had been expropriated had an excess of 297-square meter lot.  Reyes filed case for the just compensation for her properties and for the consequential damage of her (297 sq-Meter lot) property.

Issue:

            Whether or not the grant of consequential damages to the owner with respect to the excess lot that had been part of the lot expropriated by the government is unjust

Held:

            No.

Ratio:

            An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."

            If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining of private respondent suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Fortune Tobacco (705 SCRA 430) Digest

9.   Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Fortune Tobacco

705 scra 430

Facts:

            Prior to January 1, 1997, the above-mentioned cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then Section 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect whereby a shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax system was made and subjecting the aforesaid cigarette brands to specific tax under [S]ection 142 thereof, now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997. 

            With this regards, Fortune Tobacco Corporation paid to the BIR the excessive amount of taxes; due to the BIR mistake in the law. 

Issue:

            Whether or not the Government is exempted from the application of solutio indebiti

Held:

            No

Ratio:

Tax refunds (or tax credits), on the other hand, are not founded principally on legislative grace but on the legal principle which underlies all quasi-contracts abhorring a person’s unjust enrichment at the expense of another. The dynamic of erroneous payment of tax fits to a tee the prototypic quasi-contract, solutio indebiti, which covers not only mistake in fact but also mistake in law.

The Government is not exempt from the application of solutio indebiti.

Torres vs CA [278 SCRA 793] (Case Digest)

Torres vs CA

278 scra 793

Facts:

            The late Judge Torres had shares of stocks in Tormil Realty & Development Corporation.  At the time of the assignments and exchange, however, only 225,000 Tormil Realty shares remained unsubscribed, all of which were duly issued to and received by Judge Torres (as evidenced by stock certificates Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 25).

Due to the insufficient number of shares of stock issued to Judge Torres and the alleged refusal of private respondents to approve the needed increase in the corporation's authorized capital stock (to cover the shortage of 972 shares due to Judge Torres under the "estate planning" scheme), on 11 September 1986, Judge Torres revoked the two (2) deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay City.

Noting the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay City properties from the corporation's inventory of assets and financial records private respondents, on 31 March 1987, were constrained to file a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

SEC and CA rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. 

Issue:

            Whether or not there is a legal basis for Judge Torres' act of revoking the assignment of his properties in Makati and Pasay City to Tormil corporation by relying on Art. 1191 of the Civil Code

Held:

            No

Ratio:

The aforequoted Civil Code provision does not apply in this particular situation for the obvious reason that a specific number of shares of stock (as evidenced by stock certificates) had already been issued to the late Judge Torres in exchange for his Makati and Pasay City properties.

VICENTE S. ALMARIO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (532 scra 614)

VICENTE S. ALMARIO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

532 scra 614

Facts:

            On October 21, 1988, petitioner, Vicente S. Almario (Almario), was hired by respondent, Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer.
On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age¹ and a Boeing 737 (B-737) First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer.² Since said higher position required additional training, he underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia.³
After completing the training course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight months of service as such or on September 16, 1996, he tendered his resignation, for "personal reasons," effective October 15, 1996

Issue:

                Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that Article 22 of the Civil Code can be applied to recover training costs which were never agreed to nor included as reimbursable expenses under the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Held:

                No

Ratio:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him, applies.

This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another. An authority on Civil Law³⁴ writes on the subject, viz:

Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.