Joson vs Torres G.R. No. 131255 (Case Digest)

 

Joson vs Torres

G.R. No. 131255

Facts:

            Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.  DILG Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy which the parties reached peace agreement.  The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner asked the DILG to give him an additional time to answer the complaint.  Since the DILG give only 10 days to the petitioner within which the latter will answer the complaint; and failed to do so.  Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default.

            Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, to answer the complaint.

 

            On recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.

            Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default. CA dismissed the petition. 

 

Issue:

            Whether CA erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.

 

Held:

            NO. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.

            The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.

 

===

è Doctrine of qualified political agency

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

 

è Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

 

Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:

            Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.

            Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.

The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.

 

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

 

è

The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.  And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

 

 

            Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23.

 

                An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.

 

                In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.

 

                Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.

 

                Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Ganzon vs Ca, G.R. No. 93252 (Case Digest)

 

Ganzon vs Ca,

G.R. No. 93252

                                                                             

Facts:

            The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges. Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government in RTC Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced special proceeding in CA, a petition for prohibition.  CA dismiss the action filed by Ganzon.

                Petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.

 

Held:

            YES [but not oppressively as in this case]. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.

                As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

====

 

àà

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

 

SC reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion

 

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

àSC can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

 

 

è

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary

 

èControl vs Supervision

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."

"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

 

The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

 

è

Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels

 

è

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

 

 

 

            It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

                Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.