Dial Corp. vs Soriano, G.R. No. 82330 (Case Digest)

Dial Corp. vs Soriano,

G.R. No. 82330

Facts:

            The petitioners are foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia, are not domiciled in the Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here. The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Company (IVO) is a Philippine corporation, which through its president Monteverde had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute between the parties will be settled through arbitration. Because IVO defaulted under the contracts, the petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained arbitration awards against IVO.

            IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages against nineteen (19) foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners. IVO repudiated Monteverde's contracts on the grounds that they were mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties; that the Board of Directors of IVO convened in a special meeting on March 21, 1987 and removed Dominador Monteverde from his position as president of the corporation.

            Respondent Judge authorized it to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines corp. Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service.

            Without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only for the purpose of objecting to the said jurisdiction over their persons, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The court denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or equitable.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the summons effected to herein petitioner is valid.

 

Held:

            NO. Only in four (4) instances is extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" [Sec. 17, Rule 14].

            The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person." (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 76 SCRA 85). A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property (Hernandez vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 292).

            As Civil Case No. 87-40166 is a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.

            In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders.

Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment "(Boudard vs. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174).

 

Carreon vs Aguillon G.R. No. 240108, June 29, 2020 [Case Digest]

 

Carreon vs Aguillon

G.R. No. 240108, June 29, 2020

Facts:

                A complaint for breach of contract, damages, and attorney's fees filed by respondent Mario Aguillon (Aguillon) against Carreon and his wife, Isabel. RTC, upon Aguillon's motion, declared the defendants in default for failure to file their responsive pleading within the reglementary period despite receipt of summons and a copy of the complaint through their "son" at their residence.

                The RTC's Decision attained finality, and consequently, a writ of execution was issued on April 12, 2011. Consequently, the Sheriff levied on the property belonging to the defendants, which was purportedly their family home. The property was thereafter sold at a public auction where the highest bidder thereof was respondent Betty P. Lopez (Lopez). Thereafter, a Final Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.9

On December 5, 2013, Lopez filed a petition for cancellation10 of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-208860 registered in the name of the defendants and for the issuance of a new one in her name. On December 12, 2013, the RTC issued an Order requiring the defendants to appear at the hearing of the petition. However, the Return of Service dated January 27, 2014 did not reflect service upon them of a copy of the December 12, 2013 Order. Nonetheless, the RTC proceeded to hear the petition; and on February 17, 2014, it issued an Order granting the same. The defendants were then directed to surrender their Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-208860 while the Register of Deeds of Davao City was ordered to cancel the same and to issue a new one in the name of Lopez.

Left with no legal recourse, Carreon, by himself, filed the Annulment Petition before the CA on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud premised on the improper/invalid service of summons. In a Resolution dated July 28, 2017, the CA dismissed the Annulment Petition on procedural grounds as Carreon failed to, inter alia: (a) attach the affidavit of service of the petition to the court of origin as well as the adverse parties; (b) attach a copy of TCT No. T-208860; and (c) submit affidavit/s of witness/es or documents in support of the cause of action or defense.

Carreon filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation, explaining that (a) the affidavit of service is not required in a petition for annulment of judgment, the same being an original action before the CA; hence, the rule on service of summons is applicable; (b) the failure to attach a copy of TCT No. T-208860 is not a fatal error to warrant the dismissal of the petition, but he nonetheless attached a copy thereof; and (c) Carreon himself, as well as his only child , Malaya De Luna Carreon (Malaya De Luna), and other witnesses have executed their respective affidavits in support of the Annulment Petition.

In a Resolution dated February 19, 2018, the CA reconsidered its original ruling, stating that the procedural infirmities in Carreon's petition have already been rectified. However, on the merits, it found that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Carreon and his wife Isabel, there being no irregularity in the service of summons upon them. Hence, the CA dismissed the Annulment Petition entirely.

Carreon then filed on March 8, 2018 a Motion for Reconsideration (March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration) of the February 19, 2018 Resolution. In a Resolution dated May 4, 2018, the CA noted without action the said motion, opining that it was a second motion for reconsideration which shall no longer be entertained for being a prohibited pleading. [Section 2, Rule 52]

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the motion for Reconsideration filed by Carreon on March 8, 2018 was a second motion for reconsideration.

 

 

 

Held:

                NO.        Carreon's March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration can hardly be considered as a second motion for reconsideration as contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the aforesaid motion should have actually been treated as a first motion for reconsideration because it assailed the CA's reconsidered ruling (i.e., the Resolution dated February 19, 2018), and not its original Resolution dated July 28, 2017. As will be discussed below, these Resolutions were premised on completely different legal grounds from one another.

                To recount, Carreon's earlier Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation was in response to the CA's original Resolution dated July 28, 2017 which dismissed the Annulment Petition based purely on procedural grounds. As such, this motion was intended to address the alleged procedural infirmities pointed out by the CA. In its February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA reconsidered its original resolution, holding that there was a "rectification of the infirmities" in the Annulment Petition.22 Moreover, in the same February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA proceeded to tackle the merits of the Annulment Petition itself. In particular, the CA held that the issue of extrinsic fraud raised in the Annulment Petition was "too unsubstantial to warrant consideration." Moreover, anent the claim of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the CA, citing the presumption of regularity in official duties, found that the service of summons upon the defendants was proper; therefore, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over them.

                Clearly, the CA's February 19, 2018 Resolution is a new ruling based on legal grounds that are totally different from its original July 28, 2017 Resolution; hence, when Carreon filed the March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration, he was technically filing a first motion for reconsideration of the February 19, 2018 Resolution wherein the CA, for the first time, traversed the merits of his Annulment Petition. As such, the prohibition on the filing of a second motion for reconsideration found in Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules did not come into play. Evidently, what the Rules seek to proscribe is a second motion for reconsideration, which essentially repeats or reiterates the same arguments already passed upon by the tribunal, when it resolved the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same party. If the issues had already been passed upon and there is no substantial argument raised, then the finality and immutability of a judgment should not be obviated.

CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN [GR NO. 152398] Case Digest

 

CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO. 152398

 

Facts:

Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. he Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dela Cruz; Calingayan and others all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.

The defense adduced that Renato (deceased) hung himself in his detention cell.  Sandiganbayan find the Petitioner guilty for the crime of murder because Crisostomo as jail guard was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Crisostomo for the crime even there is no direct evidence that will show the participation of Crisostomo on the alleged crime.

 

Held:

Yes.

 

Ratio:

In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder Renato, and second, Crisostomo's complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must prove that Renato's death was not the result of suicide but was produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder. Since Crisostomo had no direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction could only be sustained if the murder was carried out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused, the inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomo's action and inaction were all part of a scheme to murder Renato.

The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. Secondly, an accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.