Rosanna Tan-Andal versus
Andal
G.R. No. 196359
Facts:
Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan married on
December 16, 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati
City. Rosanna gave birth to Ma Samantha, the only child of the parties. After four years of marriage, Mario and
Rosanna separated in 2000. Rosanna has since kept the sole custody of Ma
Samantha.
While
they [Mario and Rosanna] were together [before the wedding], Rosanna noticed
that there were times when Mario "would be unaccounted for a whole night
or an entire day'' When asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he
was working. After Mario's return (in Italy), Rosanna noticed that Mario always
went out at night and would come back home at dawn, either alone or with his
friends. The parties eventually married on December 16, 1995. Mario continued with his "emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance."
He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his
whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep
for days. Mario was also
"hyper-active" late at night. Rosanna confronted Mario about his
behavior. To Rosanna's shock, Mario admitted that he was using marijuana,
although he claimed that he was not addicted and that he could stop anytime. He
then promised to stop using it. Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with
his drug use. The day after Rosanna gave birth to Ma Samantha, Mario allegedly
did not assist Rosanna. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could not
move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only returned
to the hospital later that evening to sleep.
When
Rosanna and Ma Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed
symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times,
would hide Ma Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them. Mario would also take large cash advances
from Design and Construction Matrix every week.
Rosanna only learned of Mario's numerous cash advances when an
accounting personnel informed her that the firm could no longer pay the
construction workers' salaries. Rosanna eventually got tired of Mario. She left
him, brought Ma Samantha with her, and stayed in an inn. She called up Mario to
tell him of her and Ma Samantha's whereabouts. Mario followed them to the inn
and pleaded Rosanna to give him another chance. After Mario's pleas, Rosanna
returned home with Ma Samantha.
Later,
an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that the employee
allegedly found among Mario's office belongings. When she checked, Rosanna
herself found packets of shabu among Mario's possessions. When Rosanna again
confronted Mario about his drug use, he explained that it was the only way he
could normally function due to the heavy pressures of work at the firm.
In
October 1998, Ma Samantha had dengue fever and had to be confined at the
hospital. Mario was not home and could not be reached. He arrived at the
hospital only later that evening. He would then run around the different floors
of the hospital, checking the medications prescribed to other dengue fever
patients. He would also prevent the nurses from administering the prescribed
medications to Ma Samantha. When Ma Samantha vomited, Mario, who was just
sleeping by his daughter's side, would not clean her up. He would instead
ignore the ill child, tum to the other side, and continue sleeping. Having had
enough of Mario, Rosanna drove him out of the house. After several days, Mario
returned home and pleaded Rosanna for another chance. Rosanna accepted Mario
back, but kept a close eye on him.
Several
days after he had left home, Mario tried to return, but Rosanna turned him
away. Mario banged the door, shouting, "Buksan niyo ito kundi sisirain ko
ito!" Fearing Mario, Rosanna called her parents and beeped Mario's sisters
for help. When Rosanna's parents and Mario's sisters arrived, however, Mario
had already left.
Later
that day, Mario was found loitering near the house. With him were some travel
documents, cash, and a checklist of European countries with the respective visa
requirements for entry of a child for each country. After the door-banging
incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the Medical City for detoxification.
On November 29, 1998, Mario was committed for treatment at the Medical City for
14 days. After conducting tests on Mario, the doctors found him positive for
drug use. Mario's siblings were then advised to commit him to a drug
rehabilitation center for treatment. However, defying the doctor's orders, they
had him discharged from the hospital without bringing him to a drug
rehabilitation facility.
Rosanna
decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Paranaque City that her aunt, Rita
M. Tan, had donated. Rosanna, Mario, and Ma Samantha would live in one
apartment, and Rosanna's parents would live in the other apartment. In July
1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the
small room. He found Mario and Ma Samantha inside, with the room filled with
smoke that did not quite smell of cigarettes. The electrician informed Rosanna
of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that Mario relapsed into his drug use. Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him
to get treated. However, Mario got furious and Ma Samantha, who saw her parents
fighting, started crying. To protect Ma Samantha, Rosanna brought the child to
her parents on the other side of the duplex. Mario followed them to his
parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in to get Ma Samantha. Rosanna had to
call for police assistance to pacify Mario. Mario eventually calmed down when
the police arrived. The police then searched Mario, finding packets of shabu in
his person. They were about to bring Mario to the police station for detention
when Rosanna pleaded with them not to take Mario. The police agreed, but they
released Mario to his sister, Ma Socorro. The next day, Rosanna tried to call Ma
Socorro to ask about Mario, but her calls were unanswered. Rosanna later
learned that Mario had escaped from Ma Socorro's house earlier that
moming. It was after these incidents
that Rosanna petitioned the RTC to voluntarily commit Mario for drug
rehabilitation at the NBI Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually,
at the Seagulls. On February 14, 2000,
Mario escaped from Seagulls, returning home and pleading with Rosanna to take
him in again. Rosanna took her husband in, but Mario would again relapse into
his drug use. He was also jobless and could not support his family.
In
August 2000, Ma Samantha again had severe upper respiratory tract infection and
frequent vomiting. When her nanny was about to give her medicine, Mario
prevented the nanny from doing so, saying that mangoes would cure Ma Samantha.
Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma Samantha to Makati Medical
Center. Rosanna suggested that they instead bring Ma Samantha together the next
day, which was a Saturday. Mario suddenly yelled out, "Magnanakaw!"
Rosanna, already exasperated, drove Mario out of the house. Mario, however,
dashed to the second floor, still yelling, "Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!" Police officers later arrived at their home,
having been called by Rosanna and Mario's neighbors who had heard the screams
coming from their house. Rosanna explained that it was her husband who was
yelling and that he was a drug dependent who failed to complete his
rehabilitation program. The police then brought Mario to the police station for
questioning. Ma Samantha saw her father screaming and the police taking him
with them. The child cried and had to be brought to her grandparents' house to
be pacified. Already at a loss with what
to do, Rosanna phoned the director of Seagulls, who recommended that Mario be
recommitted to the rehabilitation center to complete his rehabilitation
program. Mario remained confined there
until December 24, 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without
completing his rehabilitation program. Since Mario's release on December 24,
2000, Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together. Mario also
failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma Samantha.
These
events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's
drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder "deeply
rooted within [Mario's] adaptive system." She thus prayed that the trial
court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the sole and absolute
owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex
built on it.
On
August 6, 2003, nullity of her marriage, Rosanna filed a Petition for
declaration of claiming that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations to her.
To
prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del
Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness. In her Judicial Affidavit, Dr. Garcia
declared that she interviewed Rosanna and gathered data on Rosanna's family,
educational, and employment history. She likewise conducted mental status
examinations on Rosanna. After
evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations." According to Dr.
Garcia, Rosanna "has adequate social, interpersonal and occupational
functioning." As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic
antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic
features. Dr. Garcia characterized the disorder as: "... an abnormality in
behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity in fantasy or
behavior, need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early
childhood. People suffering from this disorder may have a grandiose sense of
self-importance or may be preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success and
power. They likewise believe that they are special and can be understood or
should associate with high-status people. They also require excessive
admiration, have a sense of entitlement and are envious of others or believe
that others envy them. Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder,
which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable,
allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's
personality disorder was grave and "deeply rooted" in his character.
Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality disorders are
"impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality" because
of "the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the
person [suffering from the disorder]."
On
cross-examination, Dr. Garcia admitted that the data she gathered all came from
Rosanna, Ma Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve. She likewise admitted diagnosing
Mario without interviewing him, because, despite several invitations from Dr.
Garcia, Mario did not appear for an interview.
Countering
Rosanna, Mario contended that it was she who was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Mario alleged that by January 1996, the
spouses were already frequently fighting. According to Mario, Rosanna would box
and kick him whenever they argued. To avoid any untoward incident, Mario would
leave the house to keep his cool. In
1997, Rosanna allegedly became uncontrollable. She would bang her head on
tables, doors, concrete walls, and closets, and would even inflict corporal
punishment on Ma Samantha. Mario denied
that he was ever a threat to Rosanna and Ma Samantha. He voluntarily committed
himself for detoxification at the Medical City and completed his six-month
rehabilitation in Seagulls. When he returned home, however, Rosanna remained
violent and would always drive Mario out of the house. Between him and Rosanna,
Mario argued that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations to him. Rosanna insisted on
living with her parents despite having her own family, resulting in her parents
constantly intruding into their marital life.
Mario filed a Petition for custody of Ma Samantha before
the Regional Trial Court. Mario argued that he and his wife had equal rights to
the custody of Ma Samantha, thus praying that he be allowed to exercise
parental authority over his daughter.
RTC found that Rosanna discharged the burden of proving
Mario's psychological incapacity. The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna's
marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having
visitation rights. Reversing the trial court's ruling, the CA found Dr.
Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be "unscientific and
unreliable" since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The Court
of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and
second-hand information fed to her by one side."
Issue:
Whether
Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations to Rosanna?
Held:
YES. Psychological
incapacity as a ground provided in Article 36 of the Family Code: ARTICLE 36. A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos versus CA [1995],
a case where the wife, after three years of marriage, left for the United
States, never to return to her husband and son. Despite the wife's abandonment
of the family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after
outlining the history of the provision and defining the term
"psychological incapacity."
After reviewing the Code Committee deliberations, this
Court determined that psychological incapacity should mean "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage." It
added that "psychological incapacity" must refer to "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it
being derived from the New Canon Law, this Court cited the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso (Dr. Veloso), a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. Dr. Veloso was of the opinion
that psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a} gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic versus
CA and Molina [335
Phil. 664] in 1997. Molina involved a wife who, after
five years of marriage, filed a case for declaration of its nullity due to her
husband's psychological incapacity. In her petition, she alleged that her
husband preferred to spend his time and money on his friends, failing to
support the family. If the husband had any money, it was because he allegedly
depended on his parents for aid. The husband eventually left her and their
child when she had to resign from work. The Molina guidelines are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at ''the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise· of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on
evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
The Molina guidelines
were applied in subsequent cases. Since Molina's promulgation in 1997 until
2008, only Antonio versus Reyes was found to have satisfied all the
requirements of Molina. Antonio involved
a wife whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.
Because of the restrictive
interpretation resulting from the application of the Molina guidelines, this
Court pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te. versus Yu-Te that
"jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed," a view that is "totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated." In Ngo., Te, this Court remarked that the
Molina guidelines worked like a "strait-jacket" in which
psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit.
Molina, however, is
silent on what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases. While there is
opinion that a nullity case under Article 36 is like any civil case that
requires preponderance of evidence, we now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his
or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof that
requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of
validity of marriages.
Yet, to comply with
the second Molina guideline, psychologists and psychiatrists, when serving as
expert witnesses, have been forced to assign a personality disorder and
pathologize the supposedly psychologically incapacitated spouse. This cruelty
could not have been the intent of the Code Committee.
It took time before
this Court, in the 2000 case of Marcos versus Marcos, [397 Phil. 840 (2000)]
declared that "a medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to." Instead, as this Court said, "the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
In light of the
foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is
neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven
through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality
structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality
that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make
it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with
his or her essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of
personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been
present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may
testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly
incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are
indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital
obligations.
Difficult to prove as
it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical
antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is
clear that the psychological incapacity must be existing "at the time of
the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." This distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce.
Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or otherwise,
that may have developed after the marriage celebration.
Reading together the
deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we
hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code is incurable, not in the medical, but in
the legal sense;
hence, the third Molina
guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so
enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a
situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible
and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage. "An undeniable pattern of such persisting
failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse]
must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological
anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."
With respect to
gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that
"mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere
"refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will." In other words,
it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause.
The persuasive effect
of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is
retained. Matrimonial consent, in turn, consists of three elements: (1) the
cognitive element, which corresponds to truth; (2) the volitive element which
corresponds to freedom; and (3) the psychosomatic element, which corresponds to
maturity. Canon 1095 refers to the psychosomatic or psychological element of
matrimonial consent. The absence of any of these three elements renders a
canonical marriage void.
To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of
dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance
with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical
illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert
opinion is not required.
As an explicit
requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a
durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed before the
parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious
psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and
convincing evidence of its existence.
Rosanna discharged the
burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing
evidence of Mario's psychological incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on
Mario's personality structure and how it was formed primarily through his
childhood and adult experiences, well before he married Rosanna. In addition to
Rosanna's testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed traits exhibiting
chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of
empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
CA erred in
discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her methodology was allegedly
"unscientific and unreliable. Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have
personal knowledge of the matters they testify on, expert witnesses do not
testify in court because they have personal knowledge of the facts of the case.
The credibility of expert witnesses does not inhere in their person; rather,
their testimony is sought because of their special knowledge, skill,
experience, or training that ordinary persons and judges do not have. Rule 130,
Section 49 of the Rules of Court on the opinion of expert witness provides:
SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence.
Doctor Garcia
possesses the special knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in
medicine and special education. She has been practicing her profession as a
physician psychiatrist since 1990, including working at the Philippine Mental
Health Association as a psychiatrist for 11 years. On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia
applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she conducted a psychiatric clinical
interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise interviewed Ma
Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical
interview and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques
in diagnosing psychiatric disorders. While ideally, the person to be diagnosed
should be personally interviewed, it is accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric
history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the
person evaluated. This is usually done if the patient is not available,
incapable, or otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case. In any case, it cannot be said that the
psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on collateral
information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history
handwritten by Mario himself while staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."
At any rate, this
Court said in Marcos that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a declaration of [nullity of
marriage due to] psychological incapacity." So long as the totality of evidence,
as in this case, sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity of one or
both of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued.
That drug addiction is
a ground for legal separation will not prevent this Court from voiding the
marriage in this case. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the
drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time
of the marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Here, the totality of
evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario's drug
abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly,
part of marriage is accepting a person for who they are, including their addictions.
However, in Mario's case, his persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated,
even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of
dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to his
wife, but to his child.
Void marriages are no
marriages. Thus, the provisions of the Family Code on property relations
between husband and wife-the systems of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, and separation of property-do not apply in disposing of properties
that may have been acquired during the parties' cohabitation. Instead, the
property regime of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code, depending on whether the parties have no
legal impediment to marry.
Here, Mario and
Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to psychological incapacity. When
they were married in 1995, Mario was 33 years old while Rosanna was 31. There
is no showing that the marriage was incestuous or void due to public policy.
They likewise lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife until they
separated in 2000. Being capacitated to marry each other and having lived
exclusively with each other albeit under a void marriage, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs their property relations. Under Article 147, wages and
salaries earned by the parties during their cohabitation shall be equally
divided between them. This is regardless of who worked to earn the wage or
salary. However, if a piece of property
was obtained through only one party's effort, work, or industry, and there is
proof that the other did not contribute through the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household, the property acquired during the cohabitation
shall be solely owned by the party who actually worked to acquire the property.
In this case, there is
proof that the Paranaque lot was not obtained by Mario and Rosanna's joint
efforts, work, or industry. Rita M. Tan, Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square
meter lot to Rosanna and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The Deed of Donation dated
August 25, 1998 provides that Rita M. Tan donated 157.50 square meters to
"Rodolfo M. Tan, married to Josefina G. Leafio"332 and to
"Rosanna L. Tan-Andal, married to Mario Andal" each. In Salas, Junior versus Aguila, [2013] this
Court held that "married to" only refers to the civil status of the
property's registered owner. Thus,
Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter Paranaque lot. Mario has
no share in this property because he did not care for and maintain the family
and the household.
In resolving issues of
custody of minors whose parents have separated, Article 213 of the Family Code
governs. It states: ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The trial court did not err in awarding Ma Samantha's custody to
Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario's right to visit his daughter.
"Love is founded
on a promise: to seek beyond ourselves in order to enable and ennoble the other
to continue to become the best version of themselves." Being in love can
be carried on the wings of poetry, announced publicly through each other's
gazes. It is made real and felt with every act of unconditional care and
comfort that the lover provides. Love can be beyond labels.
Marriage is not compulsory when in love; neither does it create love.
Nonetheless, it remains an institution designed to provide legal and public
recognition that may be well deserved not only for the couple, but also for their
families existing or yet to come.
Parting is already a sorrow. It need not be more than what it already
is.
