Erwin Tulfo vs. People, 587 Phil. 64 (2008) Digest

Erwin Tulfo vs. People, 587 Phil. 64 (2008)

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with RTC Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.

In his (Erwin Tulfo) series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. In a Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:

            Whether or not Tulfo’s articles are qualified privileged communications

Held:

            No.

Ratio:

            The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been crossed.

            The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.

Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So's name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014) Digest

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014)

By: G-one T. Paisones

Salient Feature:

            2016 Bar Examination; Question No. 3

Facts:

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”

Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.

Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

            On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. 

Issue:

            Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC).

Held:

            Entire province of Nueva Ecija

Ratio:

            The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price.  It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province.  This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”

People vs. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994) Digest

People vs. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994)

By: G-one T. Paisones

Salient Feature:

            2016 Bar Examination; Question No. 1

Facts:

            Samuel Marra charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 

            At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police Station received a report about the shooting incident in the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded to the crime scene along with his three companions. Jimmy Din informed them (SPO3 de Vera) that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform.

They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a nearby bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some companions, chasing two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that the man was wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard might be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in a security guard's uniform.

They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they learned that he was Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to him was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street.

When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation but when informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at the victim only once. Tandoc allegedly had a samurai sword with him at the time of the incident. However, persistent efforts on the part of the policemen to thereafter locate said bladed weapon proved futile. Marra also admitted that prior to the incident; he chased the victim and Din. The officers then took Marra to the police station where he was detained.

Issue:

            Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-defense.

Held:

            No.

Ratio:

            Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

            In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform.

Gamboa vs. Teves, 652 SCRA 690 (2011) Digest

Gamboa vs. Teves, 652 SCRA 690 (2011)

By: G-one T. Paisones

Salient Feature:

            2016 Bar Examination; Question No. 2

Facts:

On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among others, that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMo's common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional limit. Petitioner asserts:

If and when the sale is completed, First Pacific's equity in PLDT will go up from 30.7 percent to 37.0 percent of its common - or voting- stockholdings, x x x. Hence, the consummation of the sale will put the two largest foreign investors in PLDT - First Pacific and Japan's NTT DoCoMo, which is the world's largest wireless telecommunications firm, owning 51.56 percent of PLDT common equity. x x x With the completion of the sale, data culled from the official website of the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com) showed that those foreign entities, which own at least five percent of common equity, will collectively own 81.47 percent of PLDT's common equity. x x x

x x x as the annual disclosure reports, also referred to as Form 20-K reports x x x which PLDT submitted to the New York Stock Exchange for the period 2003-2005, revealed that First Pacific and several other foreign entities breached the constitutional limit of 40 percent ownership as early as 2003. x x x"

Issue:

Whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility

Held:

            Yes.

 Ratio:

The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."

Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens