Ordillo vs. COMELEC

Ordillo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054

Case Digest

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."

The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.

On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.

On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue:

Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region

Held:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case.

Magtoto vs. Manguer G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguer G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975

Case Digest

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution.   Petitioner Magtoto stressed that since Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution favor the accused it should be given retroactive effect.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given retrospective effect

Held:

Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.

Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 131429

Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 131429

Case Digest

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap.  On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit was appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the Secretary of Justice.

On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice Secretary Guingona. The three met at the Department of Justice and, following the conference, Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases until 15 October 1997 and to turn-over the contested office to Quiaoit the next day.

On the basis of the transmittal letter of Regional State Prosecutor de Leon, Quiaoit, as directed, again so assumed office on 16 October 1997. On even date, Bermudez was detailed at the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.

Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. 

Issue:

Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit

Held:

No

Ratio:

The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power

Supreme Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the RAC, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made.

Alpha Investigation and Security Agency vs NLRC

Alpha Investigation and Security Agency vs NLRC

G.R. No. 111722

Case Digest

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:

On August 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Emiliano T. de Asis rendered a decision that the respondent Alpha Investigation and Security Agency and Mariano Marcos State University to pay each complainant the amount of P41,459.51 representing salary differential for the period from February 16, 1990 to September 30, 1991, or the total amount of P787,730.69 to the nineteen (19) respondents.

AISA and DMMSU interposed separate appeals. The NLRC, on May 7, 1993, rendered a decision affirming the solidary liability of AISA and DMMSU and remanding the records of the case to the arbitration branch of origin for computation of the salary differential awarded by the Labor Arbiter.

Only AISA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC on July 1, 1993, for lack of merit.

In this petition, AISA alleges that payment of the wage increases under the current minimum wage order should be borne exclusively by DMMSU, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act 6727 (RA 6727) which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6. In the case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar services, the prescribed increases in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the principals or clients of the construction/service contractors and the contract shall be deemed amended accordingly. In the event, however, that the principal or client fails to pay the prescribed wage rates, the construction/service contractor shall be jointly and severally liable with his principal or client."

It further contends that Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages in accordance with the Labor Code with a mandate that failure to pay such wages would make the employer and contractor jointly and severally liable for such payment. AISA insists that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials or wages increases, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general, as provided by the Labor Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code generally refer to the failure of the contractor or sub-contractor to pay wages involve only on wage differentials or wages increases (and not wages in general)?

Held:

This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. In fact, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or aparticular provision alone.

AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds support in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.

The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant with the labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.