Criminal Law 1 - Sample Test (Midterm)

Lozano vs Martinez (Digested Case Digest)

Lozano vs Martinez

GR L-63419 18 December 1986

Facts: Defendants were prosecuted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They contended that statute is unconstitutional being contrary Constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.  BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.” RTC denied their motions apart from one declaring it unconstitutional hence the petition for relief.

Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law) is unconstitutional?

Decision: BP 22 constitutional. The law is intended not to coerce the debtor to pay his det. The offense being punished is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored upon presentation. Putting them into circulation hurts public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but against public order.
It is sufficient to have reasonable connection between means and end. The facts leading to the adoption of BP 22 is cloaked with public concern. Flooding the system with worthless checks will pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and public interest.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Digested Case Digest)

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

369 SCRA 394 (2001)

Facts:

On 4 April 2001, Information for plunder was filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional.  He contends that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are violations of fundamental right of due process.

Issue:

WON the Plunder Law is a malum prohibitum?

Held:

No.

Ratio:

Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea)

o    Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. 

o    In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

§  indicates quite clearly that mens rea  is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent

o    The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se

ARANETA vs. CA (Digested Case Digest)

ARANETA v. CA [142 SCRA 532 (1986)]

Digested Case Digest

FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco approached the appellant, Atty. Araneta, to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death of her husband compensation.  She was told by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100 so that her claim would be acted upon. 

Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco; the latter then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and instructed her to go to Col Laureaga.  The latter concocted a plan to entrap the appellant.  The 2 PhP50 bills were marked w/ notations “CC-NE-1” and “CC-NE-2”, photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder.

She again approached Araneta the officer to process her claim but was again asked if she already had P100.  Yoyongco brought out the 2 P50 bills & handed them to the appellant.  As she took hold of the money, officer Balcos grabbed her hand & arrested her.  In the PC headquarters, Atty Araneta’s hands were examined for the presence of UV powder & result was positive.

Issue: Was the accused caught through entrapment?

Held: YES.

RATIO: There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.  Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of bribery, a violation of Sec 3 RA No 3019 known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” 

People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643 (1932) (Digest)

People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643 (1932)

Article 11 (Self Defense)

FACTS:

On the 23^rd of February, 1931, Sumicad along with his fellow workers saw Segundo Cubol passing along their place. Sumicad demanded that his five and on half days service should be paid. Cubol in shout asked for clarification as to what Sumicad asked then hit Sumicad with his fist. Sumicad rose from the log trying to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. Sumicad continued to recede then found himself cornered by a pile of logs.

Cubol lunged at Sumicad with evident intention of wrestling the bolo of Sumicad. Sumicad struck Cubol and delivered a blow on his right shoulder and two deep cuts on his forehead. This was witnessed by Francisco Villegeas. Villegeas turned to Sumicad and told to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion. Sumicad testified that Cubol attempted to draw a knife from his pocket when he struck him with his bolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sumicad acted on self-defense.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

It is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that Julian Sumicad was not materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements of self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

People vs. Ravelo (Digest)

People vs. Ravelo

202 SRCA 655 (1991)

Facts:

Accused-appellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano on May 21, 1984. They then detained Reynaldo at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused.  Accused-appellants assaulted, attacked, and burned Reynaldo Gaurano and latter die as consequence thereof.

On May 22, 1984; the accused-appellants kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman and was brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. Lugatiman was able to escape.

Lugatiman reported what happened to him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the accused-appellants of murder of Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman.

In this appeal, counsel contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill, which is an essential element of the offense of frustrated murder.  

Issue: 

Whether the statement by the accused stating that “Lugatiman” would be killed is sufficient proof of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder.

Held: 

No

Ratio: 

In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself.

People vs. Salvilla (Digest)

People vs. Salvilla

184 SCRA 671 (1990)

Facts:

The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with homemade guns and hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office.  In the office of Rodita; her two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside.  One of the accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which contained money.  All accused held victims as hostage when the police and military authorities had surrounded the lumber yard.  After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes their move in assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also got an injury.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

            From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

PEOPLE VS MABUG-AT (Digest)

 PEOPLE VS  MABUG-AT

G.R. No. L-25459 

Facts: 

The accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the house of another girl. The accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."

The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two, followed them without saying a word. The houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, and coming out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.

The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it was the accused's intention to kill.

Issue: 

Whether or not the accused is guilty with frustrated murder?

Held: 

Yes.

Ratio:  

The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill.

In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:

We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itselfsufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)

the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver.

The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

CIVIL LAW POINTERS FOR PRELIM

CIVIL LAW POINTERS FOR PRELIM

By: Lam Sigfred Rodriguez Maquinano

1.      RA 9048

a.      What is that all about?

b.      Who will file?

c.       Where to file?

Republic Act 9048

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL

CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL

TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL

ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST

NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER

WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER AMENDING

FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412

OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SECTION 1.Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical

Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No

entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without

a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and

change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or

consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act

and its implementing rules and regulations.

Who May File the Petition and Where. — Any

person having direct and personal interest in the correction of

a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of

first name or nickname in the civil register may fi le, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city

or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected

or changed is kept. In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be fi led, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested

party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may fi le their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions fi led with the city or municipal civil registrar

or the consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

All petitions for the correction of clerical or typographical

errors and/or change of fi rst names or nicknames may be

availed for only once.

2.      Purpose of Civil Registry

The Civil Register (or Registry) has for its object the recordingof acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning CIVIL STATUS.

3.      Contents of Civil Registry

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations;

(5) annulment of marriages; (6) judgments declaring

marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)

adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)

naturalization; (11) loss; or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)

civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of fi liation; (15)

voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

4.      Probative value of the entries in the civil registry

Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and alldocuments relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

5.      What is the civil liability of the civil registrar?

Art. 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsiblefor any unauthorized alteration made in any civil register,to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil

registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he provesthat he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent theunlawful alteration.

6.      Difference between summary proceedings and adversarial proceedings

The errors which can be corrected in mere summary

proceedings are clerical or typographical errors, not those on

such important things as legitimacy or nationality or other controversial matters. (Chomi v. Registrar, 99 Phil. 1004; Brownv. Republic, 99 Phil. 818; Ansaldo v. Republic, 102 Phil. 1046;Chua Tian Sang v. Republic, L-15101, Sept. 30, 1960; Castro v. Republic, L-17431, Apr. 30, 1963; Lui Lim v. Republic, L-18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes, et al. v. Republic, L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Ceferina V. David v. Republic, L-21316, Nov. 29, 1965). Similarly, the changing of an allegedly erroneous name registered is a SUBSTANTIAL change because the identity of a parent is affected. The proper step would be an appropriateproceeding, not a summary one. Be it noted therefore that ifthe error is a substantial or material one, same can still be corrected by a court judgment — provided that the action is not summary in nature. More detailed and appropriate proceedingsare required. (See Matias v. Republic, L-26982, May 8, 1969).A harmless change in a name that has been clearly misspelled may however be allowed under Art. 312. (Barillo v. Republic, L-14823, Dec. 28, 1961). Where the name appearing in

the Civil Registry is not incorrect but merely incomplete, such incompleteness is not sufficient to authorize correction thereof, especially if the purpose is to secure authority to use an alias. (Ong, et al. v. Republic, L-14359, Jan. 29, 1960).However, where no controversial issue exists, and the correction has for its purpose to have the records state a fact already established by competent authority, the same should be granted. (Lim v.

Republic, L-8932, May 31, 1957). A petition should also be

granted when in matters of paternity, the registrar had NO right to record the name of the alleged father, when it was only the mother who appeared at the office of the Civil Registrar and she had no authority to reveal the name of the said father. (Rocesv. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050). However, ordinarily, so long as the entry could properly be made by the Registrar, “one’s fi liation or parentage appearing in a public record where the law requires it to be entered, may not be changed except

in a proper proceeding where the person concerned is given an appropriate time to be heard.” (Beduya v. Republic, L-17639, May 29, 1964).

When a Proceeding Is Deemed An ‘Adversary’ or ‘Appropriate’

Proceeding

Three (3) instances are present before a proceeding is

deemed adversary or appropriate, to wit: (1) As long as the relevant facts have been fully and properly developed; (2) Where the opposing counsel is given the opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case; and (3) Evidence is thoroughly weighed and considered. (Republic v. CFI, L-36773, May 31, 1988).

7.      Different grounds for change of 1^st name or nickname

SEC. 4.Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.

— The petition for change of fi rst name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner fi nds the fi rst name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely diffi cult to

write or pronounce; (2) The new fi rst name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that fi rst names or nicknames in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion.

8.      No Mandamus will lie

Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil

registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of

an act prohibited by law.

Case: MossesgeldVs. CA (cross check the spelling nalang)

9.      Presumption of death (Arts. 390, 391, 392)

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-fi ve years, an absence of fi ve years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all

purposes, including the division of the estate among the

heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under

other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing

his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents.

10.  Declaration of provisional measures in case of absence (Art. 381)

a.      Who may represent in all that may be necessary?

Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired.

Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding

article having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians.

Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the

spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal

separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court.

11.  Art. 384

Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any newsabout the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared

12.  Who can ask for declaration of absence?

Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of

absence: (1) The spouse present; (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an

authentic copy of the same; (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; (4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death.

13.  Who will make arrangements for burial?

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements

for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294 (now Article 199 of the Family Code). In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

14.  Order of preference in forms of burial?

The cost of burial of a dead person shall be borne by

the nearest kin in the following order:

a) The spouse;

b) The descendants in the nearest degree;

c) The ascendant in the nearest degree; and

d) The brothers and sisters.

15.  What name will the spouse use incase of annulment

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wifeis the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname, unless:(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to anotherperson.

16.  Ways a married woman use surname

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden fi rst name and surname and add her

husband’s surname, or (2) Her maiden fi rst name and her husband’s surname, (3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.’’

17.  Burial be made according to social position

Art. 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.

The higher the social standing of the deceased in life,

the more dignified and expensive should his funeral be, as a

general rule. The Revised Penal Code, however, prohibits the pompous and elaborate funeral of a criminal who has been given the death penalty. This is for the purpose of not giving undue publicity to the notoriety in life of the criminal. In this connection, it is worthwhile to note the provisions of Art. 2165: “When funeral expenses are borne by a third person, without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third person should the latter claim reimbursement.’’

18.  Rules of survivorship

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more

persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which

of them died fi rst, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

Presumptions on Survivorship under the Revised Rules

of Court

Under the Revised Rules of Court, Art. 43 is COPIED and

is referred to as Rule 131, Sec. 5(kk). Immediately preceding it is Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj), which reads as follows:

When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as

a wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules: (a) If both were under the age of fi fifteen years, the older is presumed to have survived; (b) If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is presumed to have survived; (c) If one be under fi fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is presumed to have survived; (d) If both be over fi fifteen and under sixty, and the sexes be different, the male is presumed to have survived; if the sexes be the same, then the older;(e) If one be under fi fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is presumed to have survived.

19.  When is a foetus considered born (art. 41)

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born

if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the

mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

20.  Doctrine of presumptive personality

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived

child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorableto it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

COMMENT:

(1) Beginning of Personality

Personality does not begin at birth; it begins at conception.

This personality at conception is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the foetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality. From, of course, another viewpoint, we may say that personality (actual personality) really commences at birth, for conception may in certain cases, be already considered birth.(See wording of Art. 41).

21.  Limjuco v. Estate of Pedro Fragante

In a questionable decision of the Supreme Court, it has

held that the “estate’’ of a deceased is a person that may continue the personality of the deceased even after death — for the purpose of settling debts.

22.  Civil Personality is extinguished (art. 42)

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of

the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

How Civil Personality is Extinguished

Civil personality is extinguished by death (physical death).

Civil interdiction (civil death) merely restricts, not extinguishes,

capacity to act.

23.  Enumeration of limitation of the capacity to succeed (art. 38,39)

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of

being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are

mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

a.      Civil Interdiction

Civil interdiction (the deprivation by the court of a person’s

right):

1) To have parental or marital authority.

2) To be the guardian of the person and property of a

ward.

3) To dispose of his property by an act inter vivos(he

cannot donate, for this is an act inter vivos; but

he can make a will, for this is a disposition mortis

causa).

4) To manage his own property.

24.  Different Human Relations (Art. 19, 20, 21)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights

and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or

negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury

to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

25.  Rule of territoriality and exterritoriality

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,and other public instruments shall be governed by the lawsof the country in which they are executed.When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippinesin a foreign country, the solemnities established by the Philippinelaws shall be observed in their execution.Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Rule of Exterritoriality

Even if the act be done abroad, still if executed before

Philippine diplomatic and consular officials, the solemnities of Philippine laws shall be observed. The theory is that the act is being done within an extension of Philippine territory (the principle of exterritoriality).

26.  Principle of Nationality

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or

to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are

binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Art. 15 which is a rule of private international law (or

aconflicts rule, containing as it does a reference to a foreign

element, such as a foreign country) stresses the principle of

nationality; some other countries, like Great Britain and the

United States, stress the principle of domicile.

Does Art. 15 apply to Filipinos merely?

ANSWER:

(a) Yes — insofar as Philippine laws are concerned. (Gibbs

v. Gov’t., 49 Phil. 293).(Thus, a Filipino husband is still

a husband, under our law, wherever he may be or may

go). (Yañez v. Fuston, 29 Phil. 606). (b) No — in the sense that nationals of other countries arealso considered by us as being governed in matters ofstatus, etc., by their own national law. Thus, we may say that Filipinos are governed by Philippinelaws; foreigners, by their own national law. (In Gibbs v. Gov’t., 49 Phil. 293, the Supreme Court made the observation that “we should resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mr. and Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to their status.”) (See Babcock Templeton v. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; In re: Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). As a matter of fact, our Supreme Court has categorically stated that where the spouses are citizens of the United States, their marital and personal status, and the dissolution of such status are governed by the laws of the United States, which laws sanction divorce. This is pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code.(Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1956).

27.  LexReiSitae (Art. 16)

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is

subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both

with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Property, whether real or personal, is as a rule governed

by the lexreisitae(law of the place where the property is situated).

(Art. 16, par. 1).

It is inevitable that the rule should be thus for real property,

for after all, real property is attached to the land, and a

contrary rule may render a judgment on the land ineffective or

incapable of enforcement.

Upon the other hand, the rule enunciated under the new

Civil Code for personal property changes the old rule on the

matter. Under the old Civil Code (Art. 10, old Civil Code),

personal property was subjected to the law of the nation of the

owner; i.e., personal property followed the national or domiciliary law of the owner, under the doctrine of mobiliasequunturpersonam. The old rule grew up in the Middle Ages when movable property could easily be carried from place to place. (Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Comm. of Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18-22). However, now that there has been a great increase inthe amount and variety of personal property not immediatelyconnected with the person of the owner (Wharton, Conflicts of Laws, Secs. 297-311), it was deemed advisable by the Congress of the Philippines to adopt the doctrine of lexreisitaealso to movables. (Report of Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Chairman, Special Committee on the new Civil Code).

28.  Renvoi Doctrine

Renvoiliterally means a referring back; the problem

arises when there is a doubt as to whether a reference in our

law (such as Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code) to a foreign law (such as the national law of the deceased) —

(a) is a reference to the INTERNAL law of said foreign law;

or

(b) is a reference to the WHOLE of the foreign law, including its CONFLICTS RULES. In the latter case, if one state involved follows the nationality theory, and the other, the domiciliary theory, there is a

possibility that the problem may be referred back to the law of the first state.

29.  How are laws repealed (Art. 7)

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and

their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by

disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with

the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Rule for General and Special Laws

In case of conflict between a general and a special law,

which should prevail?

a) If the general law was enacted prior to the special law,

the latter is considered the exception to the general law.

Therefore, the general law, in general remains good law,

and there is no repeal (Lichauco v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138), except insofar as the exception or special law is

concerned.

b) If the general law was enacted after the special law, the

special law remains unless:

(1) There is an express declaration to the contrary.

(2) Or there is a clear, necessary and unreconcilable

conflict. (Cia General v. Coll. of Customs, 46 Phil. 8).

(3) Or unless the subsequent general law covers the

whole subject and is clearly intended to replace the

special law on the matter. (In re: Guzman, 73 Phil.

51; Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373).].

30.  Judicial decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the

laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

While it is true that decisions which apply or interpret

the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines (Art. 8, Civil Code) still they are NOT laws, if this were so, the courts would be allowed to legislate contrary to the principle of separation of powers. Indeed, the courts exist in order to state what the law is, not for giving it. (Jus dicere,non jus dare). There have been instances, however, when the Supreme Court has made use of “judicial statesmanship,” i.e., it has rendered decisions not based on law or custom.

Decisions Referred to in Art. 8

The decisions referred to are those enunciated by the

Supreme Court, which is the court of last resort. Thus, the

Supreme Tribunal in Miranda, et al. v. Imperial, et al. (77

Phil. 1066), categorically stated that “only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” Thus, decisions of subordinate courts are only per suasive in nature, and can have no mandatory effect. However, this rule does not militate against the fact that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which covers a point of law still undecided in the Philippines may still serve as a judicial guide to the inferior Courts. It is even possible that such conclusion or pronouncement can be raised to the status of a doctrine, if after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis and revision, the Supreme Court should fi nd that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its consecration as a rule of jurisprudence. (77 Phil. 1066; see also Gaw Sin Gee v.Market Master of the Divisoria Market, et al., C.A., 46 O.G.2617).

31.  Principle of Stare Decisis

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

In the Philippines, we adhere to the doctrine of stare

decisis(let it stand, et non quietamovere) for reasons of stability

in the law. The doctrine, which is really “adherence to

precedents,” states that once a case has been decided one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same manner. Of course, when a case has been decided erroneously, such

an error must not be perpetuated by blind obedience to the

doctrine of stare decisis. No matter how sound a doctrine may be, and no matter how long it has been followed thru the years, still if found to be contrary to law, it must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisisdoes not and should not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law. (TanChong v. Sec. of Labor, 79 Phil. 249).

32.  Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Latin Maxim on Ignorance of the Law

A familiar legal maxim is found in the Latin Ignorantialegis non excusatmeaning Ignorance of the law excuses no one. It would seem that this maxim is a bit unfair today: before the compliance is required, there must be due promulgation of the law; now then, the present method of promulgation — publication in the Official Gazette is clearly inadequate — fi rstly, the Official Gazette generally comes out several years late; secondly, how many of our citizens can get hold of a copy thereof, much less, read the same? Moreover, in a very real sense, law was made for evil men. The good hardly need law when they do good acts, this is not because they are deliberately complying with the law, but because they are simply good men. Upon the other hand, without the maxim, the corrupt will make social existence unbearable, abuses will increase, and ignorance will be rewarded.

33.  Rule when the repealing law is itself repealed

(see No. 29)

34.  Prospectivity of Laws

Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

In general, laws are prospective, not retroactive. While

the judge looks backward, the legislator must look forward. If the rule was that laws were retroactive, grave injustice wouldoccur, for these laws would punish individuals for violationsof laws not yet enacted. While ignorance of the law does not serve as an excuse, such ignorance refers only to laws that have already been enacted.

a.      What are the exceptions?

Exceptions to the Prospective Effects of Laws

While in general, laws are prospective, they are retroactive

in the following cases:

(a) If the laws themselves provide for retroactivity (Art. 4,

Civil Code), but in no case must an ex post facto law be

passed. [It should be noted that generally, the Philippine

Constitution does not prohibit retroactive laws. (Camacho

v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848).].

[NOTE: An example of an ex post facto law is one

that makes criminal and punishable an act done before

the passing of the law and which was innocent when done.

(Boston v. Cummins, 6 Ga. 102; People v. Bao, L-11324,

Mar. 29, 1958).]

[NOTE: The War Profits Tax Law, which imposed

certain taxes on profits made during the Japanese Occupation

or World War II, while retroactive in application

(since the law was enacted AFTER World War II) is not

unconstitutional since, it is NOT ex post facto. The prohibition

against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal

matters, and not to civil matters (People v. Taguba, GR

95207-17, Jan. 10, 1994, 47 SCAD 172) such as the imposition

of taxes. (Testate Estate of Fernandez, L-9141, Sept.

25, 1956).Indeed, tax statutes can expressly be allowed

retroactive operation. Such a phenomenon is indeed incidental

to social existence. (Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil.

353). Of course, failure to pay under the War Profits Tax

Law is criminally punishable, but this refers only to failure

to pay AFTER (not before) the effectivity of the law

— the taxes imposed on profits earned during the war.].

[NOTE: Art. 256 of the Family Code provides:

“This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it

does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in

accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”].

(b) If the laws are remedial in nature.

[REASON — There are no vested rights in rules

of procedure. (Aguillon v. Dir. of Lands, 17 Phil. 507).

Therefore, new rules of court on procedure can apply to

pending actions. (People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764; Art.

2258 of the Civil Code provides that procedural statutes

apply to the enforcement of rights vested under the old law.

See also Guevarra v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144; Laurel v. Misa,

76 Phil. 372).The Arbitration Law (RA 876) which took

effect on December 19, 1953, is procedural in character

and may be applied retroactively to an agreement to submit

to arbitration entered into prior to said date. (Testate

Estate of JacoboFajardo, L-9324, Aug. 30, 1957).].

(c) If the statute is penal in nature, provided:

1) It is favorable to the accused or to the convict;

2) And provided further that the accused or convict

is not a habitual delinquent as the term is defined under the Revised Penal Code. (Art. 22, Rev. Penal

Code).

[EXAMPLE: Statutes which lighten the penalty or

completely extinguish the liability. (U.S. v. Cuna, 12 Phil.

241; U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5).

Note that where the law imposes the payment of

interest for delay in the payment of taxes, the interest

cannotbe considered a penalty, and the same cannot be

applied retroactively to a tax delinquency incurred prior

to the passage of the law. The reason is that interest is

merely considered as just compensation to the state for

the delay in paying the tax; and for the concommitant

use by the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should be in

the government’s hands, especially if the interest charged

is made proportionate to the period of delay. (Maria B.

Castro v. Collector, L-12174, Dec. 28, 1962).].

(d) If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized

by the police power of the government. (Santos v.

Alvarez, 44 O.G. 4259). Laws enacted in the exercise of

police power, to which Rep. Act No. 1199 belongs, may constitutionally

affect tenancy relations created even before

the enactment or effectivity thereof. (Viuda de Ongsiako

v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 5613; Valencia, et al. v. Surtido, et

al., L-17277, May 31, 1961).

(e) If the law is curative (this is necessarily retroactive for

the precise purpose is to cure errors or irregularities).

However, this kind of law, to be valid, must not impair

vested rights nor affect fi nal judgments. (See Aetna Insurance

Co. v. O’Malley, 118 SW 3). (Frivaldo v. COMELEC

and Lee, GR 120295, June 28, 1996, 71 SCAD 413).

(f) If a substantive right be declared for the fi rst time, unless

vested rights are impaired. (See Art. 2253, par. 2; also

Uson v. Del Rosario, L-4963, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen,

49 O.G. 997; People v. Alejaga, GR L-49, O.G. 2833).

[NOTE: What constitutes a vested or acquired right

will be determined by the Courts as each particular issue

is submitted to them. The Supreme Court has defined a

vested right as some right or interest in property that has become fi xed and established that it is no longer open to

controversy. (Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). It may also

bedefined as such right the deprivation of which would

amount to a deprivation of property without due process of

law. A right is also vested when it has so far been perfected

that nothing remains to be done by the party asserting it.

(Dones v. Director, et al., L-9302, May 14, 1956).].

[NOTE: A spurious (say, adulterous) child, whose

filiation has been either judicially declared or voluntarily

admitted by the parent, was not entitled to any legitime

under the old Civil Code, but is now entitled thereto under

the new Civil Code, provided that the parent dies after

the new Civil Code became effective. This is an example

of a new right granted for the fi rst time. Be it noted,

however, that to get his rights, the spurious child must

as already stated have been recognized voluntarily or by

judicial decree. (See Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation

Commission, L-19946, Feb. 26, 1965).

But if the parent died under the old Code, the spurious

child cannot get any legitime, since this would now

impair the vested right of the other heirs. This is so even

if the inheritance has not yet been distributed, because

succession accrues from the moment of death and not from

the moment of distribution of the inheritance. (Art. 777,

Civil Code).Indeed, the law distinctly provides that successional

rights are vested upon the death of the decedent.

(Art. 2263, Civil Code).].

35.  Rights are waivable

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

a.      Requisites of a valid waiver

Rules for the Waiver of Rights

General rule — Rights may be waived

Exceptions:

(a) When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public

policy, morals, or good customs.

(b) When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a

right recognized by law. (Art. 6, Civil Code). (Unless, of

course, such waiver has been made with the consent of

such third persons).

[NOTE: Art. 6 deals with the waiver of rights, not

the waiver of obligations or duties. Waiver of obligations

or duties would be possible only if the person being possessed

of certain rights, and resultant obligations or duties

waives the said rights; or if the law itself authorizes

such waiver (e.g., if a person who has a right renounces

the same, in a sense he is exempting himself from the

obligations that may have ensued from the exercise of the

right)

36.  Principle in computing the period

Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or

nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-fi ve days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twentyfourhours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the fi rst day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

(1) Examples of How Periods Are Computed

(a) 10 months = 300 days

Thus, a debt payable in 10 months must be paid at

the end of 300 days, and not on the same date of a month,

ten months later.

(b) 1 year = 365 days

This does not, however, apply in computing the age

of a person. Thus, a person becomes 21 years old on his

21st birthday anniversary, and not on the date arrived

at by multiplying 21 by 365 days. However, in case the

law speaks of years (as in prescriptive periods for crimes),

it is believed that the number of years involved should

be multiplied by 365. Thus, if a crime that is committed

today prescribes in 10 years, the end of said period would

be 365 x 10 or, 3,650 days from today. In effect, therefore,

the period will be shorter than when the calendar reckoning

is used because certain years are LEAP YEARS. (See

NAMARCO v. Tecson, L-29131, Aug. 27, 1969).

[NOTE: Any year, except a century year, is a leap

year if it is exactly divisible by FOUR. In the case of a

century year the same must be exactly divisible by 400(four hundred) to be a LEAP YEAR (Example: the year

1,600 was a leap year).].

(c) March = 31 days

This is because the month is specifically designated

by name. (Art. 13, par. 2, Civil Code).Thus, if in a contract

it is stipulated that performance should be done,

say in the month of “March,” the act can still be validly

performed on March 31.

(d) One week = seven successive days. (Derby and Co. v.

City of Modesto, 38 Pac. 901). But a week of labor, in the

absence of any agreement, is understood to comprehend

only six labor days. (Lee Tay & Lee Chay, Inc. v. Kaisahan

Ng MgaManggagawa, L-7791, Apr. 19, 1955).

(2) Civil or Solar Month

The civil or solar or calendar month is that which agrees

with the Gregorian calendar, and those months in said calendar

are known by the names of January, February, March, etc.

They are composed of unequal portions of time. (Bouvier’s Law

Dictionary, cited in Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334).

The general rule is that when months are not designated

by name, a month is understood to be only 30 days; thus, Art.

90 of the Revised Penal Code refers to a “30-day’’ month, and

not to the solar or civil month. (People v. Del Rosario, L-7234,

May 21, 1955).

(3) Meaning of ‘Day’ Applied to the Filing of Pleadings

If the last day for submitting a pleading is today, and at

11:40 p.m. (after office hours) today it is fi led, the Supreme

Court has held that it is properly fi led on time because a day

consists of 24 hours. (See De Chavez v. Ocampo and Buenafe, 66

Phil. 76).This presupposes that the pleading was duly received

by a person authorized to do so.

[NOTE: The question has been asked: When is

mailed petition considered fi led, from the date of mailing

or from the time of actual receipt by the Court? The Supreme

Court, in the case of Caltex (Phil., Inc. v. KatipunanLabor Union, L-7496, Jan. 31, 1956), held that the petition

is considered fi led from the time of mailing. This is

because the practice in our courts is to consider the mail

as an agent of the government, so that the date of mailing

has always been considered as the date of the fi ling of any

petition, motion or paper. In Gonzalo P. Nava v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, L-19470, Jan. 30, 1965, the

Court held that while there is a presumption that a letter

duly directed and mailed was received in the regular

course of mail, still there are two facts that must fi rst be

proved before the presumption can be availed of: (a) the

letter must have been properly addressed with postage

prepaid, and (b) the letter must have been mailed.].

(4) Computation of Periods

In computing a period, the fi rst day shall be excluded, and

the last day included. (Art. 13, last par., Civil Code).Thus, 12

days after July 4, 2006 is July 16, 2006. In other words, we

just add 12 to the fi rst-mentioned date.

(5) Rule if the Last Day is a Sunday or a Legal Holiday

If the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, is the act

due that day or the following day?

It depends.

(a) In an ordinary contract, the general rule is that an act is

due even if the last day be a Sunday or a legal holiday.

Thus, a debt due on a Sunday must, in the absence of

an agreement, be paid on that Sunday. [This is because

obligations arising from contracts have the force of law

between the contracting parties. (Art. 1159, Civil Code).].

There are, of course, some exceptions, among them the

maturity date of a negotiable instrument.

(b) When the time refers to a period prescribed or allowed by

theRules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other

applicable statute, if the last day is a Sunday or a legal

holiday, it is understood that the last day should really

bethe next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday

nor a legal holiday.

37.  Doctrine of processual presumption

If the foreign law is not properly alleged and proved,

Thepresumption is that it is the same as our law. (Estate of

Suntay, 50 O.G. 5321). This presumption has been referred

to by the famed author Wharton as a “processual presumption.” (Coll. of Int. Rev. v. Fisher, et al., L-11622 and L-11668,Jan. 28, 1961).Thus, a marriage in China celebrated before a village leader therein cannot be recognized as valid in the Philippines, unless there is proof that indeed in China and according to Chinese law such a marriage is regarded as valid. Without such proof, we will assume that the law on marriage in China is the same as the law in the Philippines, and in our country, it is well-known that a village leader cannot perform a marriage, whether before or after the effectivity date of the new Civil Code. (Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, et al., L-21076, Mar. 31, 1965).

38.  When does laws take effect?

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fi fteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official Gazetteor in a newspaper of general circulation., unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

a.      When is publication needed?

Unless otherwise provided, laws shall take effect after

15 days following the completion of the publication in the Official Gazette (Art. 2, Civil Code) or in a newspaper of generalcirculation.

Tañada v. Tuvera

GR 63915, Dec. 29, 1986

The publication must be in full or it is no publication at

all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents

of the laws. It must be made in the Official Gazette, and not

elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after 15 daysfrom such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature. [NOTE: When an ordinary law or presidential decree is therefore completely published in an issue of the OfficialGazette dated say, Sep. 12, 2002, it becomes effective, unless otherwise provided, on Sep. 28, 2002 — the 16th day after its publication. (Note that the laws say “after 15 days following,”

meaning on the 16th day following publication, not on the 15^thday following: just as “after Wednesday” means Thursday, and not Wednesday.)]

[NOTE: The provision in the Administrative Code relating

toeffectivity “at the beginning of the fi fteenth day after the

completion of the publication’’ has, therefore, been repealed.]

When No Publication Is Needed

Where a law provides for its own effectivity, such as, for

example July 4, 2002; or “upon approval’’ (i.e., by the President

or by Congress over the veto of the President), publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitivein character. This was the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Askay v. Casalan (46 Phil. 179) and in Balbuna v.Sec. of Education (L-14283, Nov. 29, 1960).

If a law is signed on the last hour of June 16, and the law

itself says it becomes effective upon approval, was it already

effective even during the fi rsthour of June 16? In Republic of the Phil. v. Encarnacion (L-3936, Dec. 29, 1950), it was heldthat the answer should be in the affirmative, otherwise wewould be confronted with a situation where the fi xing of the date of effectivity would depend on the unreliable memory of man.