Simundac-Keppel vs Keppel, G.R. No. 202039 (Case Digest)

 

Simundac-Keppel vs Keppel,

G.R. No. 202039

Facts:

            Angelita Simundac Keppel got married to Reynaldo Macaraig in Germany on June 1976.  After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted to another German nurse and co-employee, Georg Keppel (Georg). Like Angelita, Georg was married to a Filipina nurse, with whom he had two children. Eventually, the attraction between Angelita and Georg developed into an intimate affair. Not long after that, Reynaldo discovered Angelita's infidelity and they separated.

            Angelita became a naturalized German citizen in February 1986.  In July 1987, Georg's wife divorced him, and so Georg felt free to come to the Philippines to meet Angelita's family in September 1987. Angelita returned to Germany to file divorce proceedings against Reynaldo, and she obtained the divorce decree she sought in June 1988. Shortly thereafter, Angelita and Georg got married in Germany on 30 August 1988.

            In 1991, Angelita and Georg entered into an agreement for the complete separation of their properties. At that time, Georg resigned from his job. To make matters worse, Georg was diagnosed with early multiple sclerosis and could not work. Since Angelita's income was barely enough to support them all, they decided to return and settle permanently in the Philippines in 1992.

                Angelita earned a considerable income from her business ventures, which she shared with Georg. However, Angelita stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when she discovered that Georg was having extramarital affairs.

                Claiming that Georg was beating her up, Angelita and her two children left their home in March 1996. Being the registered owner of their family home, Angelita sold the same to her sister. Despite said sale, Georg refused to vacate the house.

                On 26 March 1996, Angelita filed the instant petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of Georg's alleged psychological incapacity. Georg opposed the petition, insisting that the court should only issue a decree of legal separation with the consequent division of their properties and determination of Liselotte's custody. Angelita countered that there were no properties to divide between them because all the real properties that she acquired in the Philippines belong solely to her as a consequence of the agreement for complete separation of property that they previously executed in Germany in 1991.

                RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Angelita and Georg null and void.  CA set aside the judgement of annulment except for the RTC's declarion that all properties acquired in the Philippines by Angelita Simundac Keppel belong to her alone.

 

Issue:

            Whether CA erred in not declaring her marriage with Georg null and void inasmuch as Georg was suffering from psychological incapacity as provided in the Family Code.

 

Held:

            NO. Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family Code unless there is a German law that allows her to do so.

            A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a relief improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the filing thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, it was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned.

 

            Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by Angelita fails scrutiny through the lens of the Nationality Principle.

 

                è Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine, law, and this rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law. We reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and proved like any other disputed fact. Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of the following, namely: (1) official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer having legal custody of the foreign law. If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Angelita did not comply with the requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.

                èSecond, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of marriage might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

 

The courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. To have evidentiary weight in a judicial proceeding, the foreign laws should be alleged and proved like any other material fact.

 

 

=As to the case of Psychological Incapacity=

 

                Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. The disorder consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological illness.

 

-My Owned Opinion-

                èIt is submitted that the above sentences highlighted are not controlling anymore because of the recent doctrine enunciated in Tan-Andal vs Andal.

Dial Corp. vs Soriano, G.R. No. 82330 (Case Digest)

Dial Corp. vs Soriano,

G.R. No. 82330

Facts:

            The petitioners are foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia, are not domiciled in the Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here. The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Company (IVO) is a Philippine corporation, which through its president Monteverde had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute between the parties will be settled through arbitration. Because IVO defaulted under the contracts, the petitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained arbitration awards against IVO.

            IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages against nineteen (19) foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners. IVO repudiated Monteverde's contracts on the grounds that they were mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties; that the Board of Directors of IVO convened in a special meeting on March 21, 1987 and removed Dominador Monteverde from his position as president of the corporation.

            Respondent Judge authorized it to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines corp. Pursuant to that order, the petitioners were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service.

            Without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only for the purpose of objecting to the said jurisdiction over their persons, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The court denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or equitable.

           

 

Issue:

            Whether the summons effected to herein petitioner is valid.

 

Held:

            NO. Only in four (4) instances is extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" [Sec. 17, Rule 14].

            The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person." (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 76 SCRA 85). A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property (Hernandez vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 292).

            As Civil Case No. 87-40166 is a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.

            In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders.

Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment "(Boudard vs. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174).