Vda. De Canilang vs CA G.R. No. 92492 (Digest)

 

Vda. De Canilang vs CA

G.R. No. 92492

Facts:

                Jaime Canilang applied for a "non-medical" insurance policy with respondent Great Pacific Life Assurance Company ("Great Pacific") naming his wife, Thelma Canilang, as his beneficiary.  Jaime Canilang was issued ordinary life insurance Policy No. 345163, with the face value of P19,700.  Jaime Canilang died of "congestive heart failure," "anemia," and "chronic anemia.  Petitioner, widow and beneficiary of the insured, filed a claim with Great Pacific which the insurer denied on 5 December 1983 upon the ground that the insured had concealed material information from it. 

                Petitioner then filed a complaint against Great Pacific with the Insurance Commission for recovery of the insurance proceeds. During the hearing called by the Insurance Commissioner, petitioner testified that she was not aware of any serious illness suffered by her late husband and that, as far as she knew, her husband had died because of a kidney disorder. A deposition given by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio was presented by petitioner. There Dr. Claudio stated that he was the family physician of the deceased Jaime Canilang and that he had previously treated him for "sinus tachycardia" and "acute bronchitis." Great Pacific for its part presented Dr. Esperanza Quismorio, a physician and a medical underwriter working for Great Pacific. She testified that the deceased's insurance application had been approved on the basis of his medical declaration. She explained that as a rule, medical examinations are required only in cases where the applicant has indicated in his application for insurance coverage that he has previously undergone medical consultation and hospitalization.

                Insurance Commissioner held that “Great Pacific had waived its right to inquire into the health condition of the applicant by the issuance of the policy despite the lack of answers to "some of the pertinent questions" in the insurance application.”  CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Insurance Commissioner and dismissed Thelma Canilang's complaint and Great Pacific's counterclaim.  CA also found that the failure of Jaime Canilang to disclose previous medical consultation and treatment constituted material information which should have been communicated to Great Pacific to enable the latter to make proper inquiries. The Court of Appeals finally held that the Ng Gan Zee case which had involved misrepresentation was not applicable in respect of the case at bar which involves concealment.

 

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the concealment made by Wilfredo is material to avoid the insurance.

 

Held:

YES.  Sec. 26 (ICP). A neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate, is called a concealment. Sec. 28. Each party to a contract of insurance must communicate to the other, in good faith, all factors within his knowledge which are material to the contract and as to which he makes no warranty, and which the other has not the means of ascertaining. [have] communicate[d]," that is to say, information which was "material to the contract." The test of materiality is contained in Section 31 of the Insurance Code of 1978 which reads: Sec. 31.  Materially is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries.

"Sinus tachycardia" is considered present "when the heart rate exceeds 100 beats per minute."  The symptoms of this condition include pounding in the chest and sometimes faintness and weakness of the person affected.

                SC We agree with the CA that the information which Jaime Canilang failed to disclose was material to the ability of Great Pacific to estimate the probable risk he presented as a subject of life insurance. Had Canilang disclosed his visits to his doctor, the diagnosis made and medicines prescribed by such doctor, in the insurance application, it may be reasonably assumed that Great Pacific would have made further inquiries and would have probably refused to issue a non-medical insurance policy or, at the very least, required a higher premium for the same coverage.

                The restoration in 1985 by B.P. Blg. 874 of the phrase "whether intentional or unintentional" merely underscored the fact that all throughout (from 1914 to 1985), the statute did not require proof that concealment must be "intentional" in order to authorize rescission by the injured party.

Saturnino vs. Phil. American Life Insurance Co. G.R. No. L-16163 (Digest)

 

Saturnino vs. Phil. American Life Insurance Co.

G.R. No. L-16163

Facts:

                Ignacio Saturnino filed an action in the CFI-Manila to recover the sum of P5,000.00 which correspond the value of the insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of his wife Estefania.  PhilAm Life set up special defenses in its answer with a counterclaim.  Both the complaint and the counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court; ; but appellants were declared entitled to the return of the premium already paid; plus interest at 6% up to January 8, 1959.

            The policy sued upon is one for 20-year endowment non-medical insurance. This kind of policy dispenses with the medical examination of the applicant usually required in ordinary life policies. However, detailed information is called for in the application concerning the applicant's health and medical history. The written application in this case was submitted by Saturnino to appellee on November 16, 1957, witnessed by appellee's agent Edward A. Santos. The policy was issued on the same day, upon payment of the first year's premium of P339.25. On September 19, 1958 Saturnino died of pneumonia, secondary to influenza. Appellants here, who are her surviving husband and minor child, respectively, demanded payment of the face value of the policy. The claim was rejected and this suit was subsequently instituted.

                It appears that two months prior to the issuance of the policy or on September 9, 1957, Saturnino was operated on for cancer, involving complete removal of the right breast, including the pectoral muscles and the glands found in the right armpit. She stayed in the hospital for a period of eight days, after which she was discharged, although according to the surgeon who operated on her she could not be considered definitely cured, her ailment being of the malignant type.

Notwithstanding the fact of her operation Estefania A. Saturnino did not make a disclosure thereof in her application for insurance. On the contrary, she stated therein that she did not have, nor had she ever had, among other ailments listed in the application, cancer or other tumors; that she had not consulted any physician, undergone any operation or suffered any injury within the preceding five years; and that she had never been treated for nor did she ever have any illness or disease peculiar to her sex, particularly of the breast, ovaries, uterus, and menstrual disorders.

 

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the insured made such false representations of material facts as to avoid the policy.

 

Held:

                YES. There can be no dispute that the information given by her in her application for insurance was false, namely, that she had never had cancer or tumors, or consulted any physician or undergone any operation within the preceding period of five years.

            The Insurance Law (Section 30) provides that "materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries." It seems to be the contention of appellants that the facts subject of the representation were not material in view of the "non-medical" nature of the insurance applied for, which does away with the usual requirement of medical examination before the policy is issued. The contention is without merit. If anything, the waiver of medical examination renders even more material the information required of the applicant concerning previous condition of health and diseases suffered, for such information necessarily constitutes an important factor which the insurer takes into consideration in deciding whether to issue the policy or not. It is logical to assume that if appellee had been properly apprised of the insured's medical history she would at least have been made to undergo medical examination in order to determine her insurability.

            In the application for insurance signed by the insured in this case, she agreed to submit to a medical examination by a duly appointed examiner of appellee if in the latter's opinion such examination was necessary as further evidence of insurability. In not asking her to submit to a medical examination, appellants maintain, appellee was guilty of negligence, which precluded it from finding about her actual state of health. No such negligence can be imputed to appellee. It was precisely because the insured had given herself a clean bill of health that appellee no longer considered an actual medical check-up necessary.

                Appellants also contend there was no fraudulent concealment of the truth inasmuch as the insured herself did not know, since her doctor never told her, that the disease for which she had been operated on was cancer. In the first place the concealment of the fact of the operation itself was fraudulent, as there could not have been any mistake about it, no matter what the ailment. Secondly, in order to avoid a policy it is not necessary to show actual fraud on the part of the insured.

            In this jurisdiction a concealment, whether intentional or unintentional, entitles the insurer to rescind the contract of insurance, concealment being defined as "negligence to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate" (Sections 24 & 26, Act No. 2427). In the case of Argente v. West Coast Life Insurance Co., 51 Phil. 725, 732, this Court said, quoting from Joyce, The Law of Insurance, 2nd ed., Vol. 3:

"The basis of the rule vitiating the contract in cases of concealment is that it misleads or deceives the insurer into accepting the risk, or accepting it at the rate of premium agreed upon. The insurer, relying upon the belief that the assured will disclose every material fact within his actual or presumed knowledge, is misled into a belief that the circumstance withheld does not exist, and he is thereby induced to estimate the risk upon a false basis that it does not exist."

 

 

Carreon vs Aguillon G.R. No. 240108, June 29, 2020 [Case Digest]

 

Carreon vs Aguillon

G.R. No. 240108, June 29, 2020

Facts:

                A complaint for breach of contract, damages, and attorney's fees filed by respondent Mario Aguillon (Aguillon) against Carreon and his wife, Isabel. RTC, upon Aguillon's motion, declared the defendants in default for failure to file their responsive pleading within the reglementary period despite receipt of summons and a copy of the complaint through their "son" at their residence.

                The RTC's Decision attained finality, and consequently, a writ of execution was issued on April 12, 2011. Consequently, the Sheriff levied on the property belonging to the defendants, which was purportedly their family home. The property was thereafter sold at a public auction where the highest bidder thereof was respondent Betty P. Lopez (Lopez). Thereafter, a Final Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.9

On December 5, 2013, Lopez filed a petition for cancellation10 of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-208860 registered in the name of the defendants and for the issuance of a new one in her name. On December 12, 2013, the RTC issued an Order requiring the defendants to appear at the hearing of the petition. However, the Return of Service dated January 27, 2014 did not reflect service upon them of a copy of the December 12, 2013 Order. Nonetheless, the RTC proceeded to hear the petition; and on February 17, 2014, it issued an Order granting the same. The defendants were then directed to surrender their Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-208860 while the Register of Deeds of Davao City was ordered to cancel the same and to issue a new one in the name of Lopez.

Left with no legal recourse, Carreon, by himself, filed the Annulment Petition before the CA on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud premised on the improper/invalid service of summons. In a Resolution dated July 28, 2017, the CA dismissed the Annulment Petition on procedural grounds as Carreon failed to, inter alia: (a) attach the affidavit of service of the petition to the court of origin as well as the adverse parties; (b) attach a copy of TCT No. T-208860; and (c) submit affidavit/s of witness/es or documents in support of the cause of action or defense.

Carreon filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation, explaining that (a) the affidavit of service is not required in a petition for annulment of judgment, the same being an original action before the CA; hence, the rule on service of summons is applicable; (b) the failure to attach a copy of TCT No. T-208860 is not a fatal error to warrant the dismissal of the petition, but he nonetheless attached a copy thereof; and (c) Carreon himself, as well as his only child , Malaya De Luna Carreon (Malaya De Luna), and other witnesses have executed their respective affidavits in support of the Annulment Petition.

In a Resolution dated February 19, 2018, the CA reconsidered its original ruling, stating that the procedural infirmities in Carreon's petition have already been rectified. However, on the merits, it found that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Carreon and his wife Isabel, there being no irregularity in the service of summons upon them. Hence, the CA dismissed the Annulment Petition entirely.

Carreon then filed on March 8, 2018 a Motion for Reconsideration (March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration) of the February 19, 2018 Resolution. In a Resolution dated May 4, 2018, the CA noted without action the said motion, opining that it was a second motion for reconsideration which shall no longer be entertained for being a prohibited pleading. [Section 2, Rule 52]

 

Issue:

                Whether or not the motion for Reconsideration filed by Carreon on March 8, 2018 was a second motion for reconsideration.

 

 

 

Held:

                NO.        Carreon's March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration can hardly be considered as a second motion for reconsideration as contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the aforesaid motion should have actually been treated as a first motion for reconsideration because it assailed the CA's reconsidered ruling (i.e., the Resolution dated February 19, 2018), and not its original Resolution dated July 28, 2017. As will be discussed below, these Resolutions were premised on completely different legal grounds from one another.

                To recount, Carreon's earlier Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation was in response to the CA's original Resolution dated July 28, 2017 which dismissed the Annulment Petition based purely on procedural grounds. As such, this motion was intended to address the alleged procedural infirmities pointed out by the CA. In its February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA reconsidered its original resolution, holding that there was a "rectification of the infirmities" in the Annulment Petition.22 Moreover, in the same February 19, 2018 Resolution, the CA proceeded to tackle the merits of the Annulment Petition itself. In particular, the CA held that the issue of extrinsic fraud raised in the Annulment Petition was "too unsubstantial to warrant consideration." Moreover, anent the claim of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the CA, citing the presumption of regularity in official duties, found that the service of summons upon the defendants was proper; therefore, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over them.

                Clearly, the CA's February 19, 2018 Resolution is a new ruling based on legal grounds that are totally different from its original July 28, 2017 Resolution; hence, when Carreon filed the March 8, 2018 Motion for Reconsideration, he was technically filing a first motion for reconsideration of the February 19, 2018 Resolution wherein the CA, for the first time, traversed the merits of his Annulment Petition. As such, the prohibition on the filing of a second motion for reconsideration found in Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules did not come into play. Evidently, what the Rules seek to proscribe is a second motion for reconsideration, which essentially repeats or reiterates the same arguments already passed upon by the tribunal, when it resolved the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same party. If the issues had already been passed upon and there is no substantial argument raised, then the finality and immutability of a judgment should not be obviated.

CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN [GR NO. 152398] Case Digest

 

CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO. 152398

 

Facts:

Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. he Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dela Cruz; Calingayan and others all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.

The defense adduced that Renato (deceased) hung himself in his detention cell.  Sandiganbayan find the Petitioner guilty for the crime of murder because Crisostomo as jail guard was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing.

 

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Crisostomo for the crime even there is no direct evidence that will show the participation of Crisostomo on the alleged crime.

 

Held:

Yes.

 

Ratio:

In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder Renato, and second, Crisostomo's complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must prove that Renato's death was not the result of suicide but was produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder. Since Crisostomo had no direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction could only be sustained if the murder was carried out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused, the inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomo's action and inaction were all part of a scheme to murder Renato.

The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. Secondly, an accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.